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Abstract
In the framework of the ESPRIT project 28620 “TIRAN”
(tailorable fault tolerance frameworks for embedded appli-
cations), a toolset of error detection, isolation, and recov-
ery components is being designed to serve as a basic means
for orchestrating application-level fault tolerance. These
tools will be used either as stand-alone components or as
the peripheral components of a distributed application, that
we call “the backbone”. The backbone is to run in the
background of the user application. Its objectives include
(1) gathering and maintaining error detection information
produced by TIRAN components like watchdog timers, trap
handlers, or by external detection services working at ker-
nel or driver level, and (2) using this information at error
recovery time. In particular, those TIRAN tools related to
error detection and fault masking will forward their deduc-
tions to the backbone that, in turn, will make use of this in-
formation to orchestrate error recovery, requesting recovery
and reconfiguration actions to those tools related to error
isolation and recovery. Clearly a key point in this approach
is guaranteeing that the backbone itself tolerates internal
and external faults. In this article we describe one of the
means that are used within the TIRAN backbone to fulfill
this goal: a distributed algorithm for tolerating crash fail-
ures triggered by faults affecting at most all but one of the
components of the backbone or at most all but one of the
nodes of the system. We call this the algorithm of mutual
suspicion.
1. Introduction
In the framework of the ESPRIT project 28620
“TIRAN” [4], a toolset of error detection, isolation, and
recovery components is being developed to serve as a ba-
sic means for orchestrating application-level software fault
tolerance. The basic components of this toolset can be con-
sidered as ready-made software tools that the developer has
to embed into his/her application so to enhance its depend-
ability. These tools include, e.g., watchdog timers, trap han-
dlers, local and distributed voting tools.
The main difference between TIRAN and other libraries
with similar purposes, e.g., ISIS [3] or HATS [12], is the
adoption of a special component, located between the ba-
sic toolset and the user application. This entity is transpar-
ently replicated on each node of the system, to keep track of
events originating in the basic layer (e.g., a missing heart-
beat from a task guarded by a watchdog) or in the user ap-
plication (e.g., the spawning of a new task), and to allow the
orchestration of system-wide error recovery and reconfigu-
ration. We call this component “the backbone”.
In order to perform these tasks, the backbone hooks to
each active instance of the basic tools and is transparently
informed of any error detection or fault masking event tak-
ing place in the system. Similarly, it also hooks to a li-
brary of basic services. This library includes, among others,
functions for remote communication, for task creation and
management, and to access the local hardware clock. These
functions are instrumented so to transparently forward to
the backbone notifications of events like the creation or the
termination of a thread. Special low-level services at kernel
or at driver-level are also hooked to the backbone—for ex-
ample, on a custom board based on Analog Devices ADSP-
21020 DSP and on IEEE 1355-compliant communication
chips [1], communication faults are transparently notified
to the backbone by driver-level tools. Doing this, an infor-
mation stream flows on each node from different abstract
layers to the local component of the backbone. This com-
ponent maintains and updates this information in the form
of a system database, also replicating it on different nodes.
Whenever an error is detected or a fault is masked, those
TIRAN tools related to error detection and fault mask-
ing forward their deductions to the backbone that, in turn,
makes use of this information to manage error recovery, re-
questing recovery and reconfiguration actions to those tools
related to error isolation and recovery (see Fig. 1).
The specification of which actions to take is to be sup-
Figure 1. Each processing node of the system
hosts one agent of the backbone. This com-
ponent is the intermediary of the backbone
on that node. In particular, it gathers informa-
tion from the TIRAN tools for error detection
and fault containment (grey circles) and for-
wards requests to those tools managing er-
ror containment and recovery (light grey cir-
cles). These latter execute recovery actions
and possibly, at test time, fault injection re-
quests.
plied by the user in the form of a “recovery script”, a sort of
ancillary application context devoted to error recovery con-
cerns, consisting of a number of guarded commands: the
execution of blocks of basic recovery actions, e.g., restart-
ing a group of tasks, rebooting a node and so forth, is then
subject to the evaluation of boolean clauses based on the
current contents of the system database—for further infor-
mation on this subject see [9, 11].
Clearly a key point in this scheme is guaranteeing that
the backbone itself tolerates internal as well external faults.
In this article we describe one of the means that have been
designed within the TIRAN backbone to fulfill this goal: a
distributed algorithm for tolerating crash failures triggered
by faults affecting at most all but one of the components of
the backbone. We call this the algorithm of mutual suspi-
cion. As in [6], we assume a timed asynchronous distributed
system model [5]. Furthermore, we assume the availability
of asynchronous communication means. No atomic broad-
cast primitive is required.
2. Basic assumptions
The target system is a distributed system consisting of
n nodes (n ≥ 1). Nodes are assumed to be labeled with a
unique number in {0, . . . , n − 1}. The backbone is a dis-
tributed application consisting of n triplets of tasks:
(task D, task I, task R).
Basically task D bears its name from the fact that it deals
with the system database of the backbone, while task I
manages “I’m alive” signals, and task R deals with error
recovery (see further on). We call “agent” any such triplet.
At initialisation time, on each node there is exactly one
agent, identified through the label of the node where it runs
on. For any 0 ≤ k < n, we call “t[k]” task t of agent
k. Agents play two roles: coordinator (also called manager)
and assistant (also called backup agent or simply “backup”).
In the initial, correct state there is just one coordinator. The
choice of which node should host the coordinator, as well as
system configuration and node labeling is done at compile
time through a configuration script.
Figure 2 displays a backbone running on a four node sys-
tem (a Parsytec Xplorer MIMD engine based on PowerPC
microprocessors). In this case, node zero hosts the coordi-
nator while nodes 1–3 execute as assistants. In the portrayed
situation no errors have been detected, and this is rendered
with green circles and a status label equal to“OK”.
Each agent, be it a coordinator or an assistant, executes
a number of common tasks. Among these tasks we have:
1. Interfacing the instances of the basic tools of the
framework—this is to be carried out by task D.
2. Organizing/maintaining data gathered from the
instances—also specific of task D.
3. Error recovery and reconfiguration management (task
R).
4. Self-check. This takes place through a distributed al-
gorithm that is executed by task D and task I in all
agents in the case that n > 1.
This article does not cover points 1–3; in particular
points 1 and 2 are dealt with as reported in [10], while the
issue of error recovery and reconfiguration management is
described in [9]. In the following, we describe the algorithm
mentioned at point 4. As the key point of this algorithm is
the fact that the coordinator and assistants mutually ques-
tion their state, we call this the algorithm of mutual suspi-
cion (AMS).
Figure 2. A Netscape browser offers a global
view of the TIRAN backbone: number, role,
and state of each component is displayed.
“DIR net” is a nickname for the backbone.
“OK” means that no faults have been de-
tected. When the user selects a component,
further information related to that component
is displayed. The small icon on bottom links
to a page with information related to error re-
covery.
3. The algorithm of mutual suspicion
This Section describes AMS. Simulation and testing
show that AMS is capable of tolerating crash failures of
up to n − 1 agents (some or all of which may by caused
by a node crash). This implies fail-stop behaviour, that can
be reached in hardware, e.g., by architectures based on du-
plication and comparison [14], and coupled with other tech-
niques like, e.g., control flow monitoring [15] or diversifica-
tion and comparison [13]. If a coordinator or its node crash,
a non-crashed assistant becomes coordinator. Whenever a
crashed agent is restarted, possibly after a node reboot, it is
inserted again in the backbone as an assistant. Let us first
sketch the structure of AMS. Let m be the node where the
coordinator first runs on. In short:
• The coordinator periodically broadcasts a MIA (man-
ager is alive) message as part of its task D, the assis-
tants periodically send the coordinator a TAIA (this as-
Figure 3. A representation of the algorithm of
the manager.
sistant is alive) message as part of their task D.
• For each 0 ≤ k < n, task D[k] periodically sets a flag.
This flag is periodically cleared by task I[k].
• If, for any valid j, task I[j] finds that the flag has
not been set during the period just elapsed, task I[j]
broadcasts a TEIF (this entity is faulty) message.
• When any agent, say the agent on node g, does not re-
ceive any timely message from an other agent, say the
agent on node f , be that a MIA or a TAIA message,
then agent g enters a so-called suspicion-period by set-
ting flag sus[f ]. This state leads to three possible next
states, corresponding to these events:
1. Agent g receives a TEIF from task I[f ] within a
specific time period, say t clock ticks.
2. Agent g receives a (late) TAIA from task D[f ]
within t clock ticks.
3. No message is received by agent g from neither
task I[f ] nor task D[f ] within t clock ticks.
Figure 4. A representation of the algorithm of
the assistant.
State 1 corresponds to deduction “agent on node f has
crashed, though node f is still operational”. State 2
translates into deduction “both agent on node f and
node f are operational, though for some reason agent f
or its communication means have been slowed down”.
State 3 is the detection of a crash failure for node f .
These deductions lead to actions aiming at recovering
agent f or (if possible) the whole node f , possibly
electing a new coordinator. In the present version of
AMS, the election algorithm is simply carried out as-
suming the next coordinator to be the assistant on node
m+ 1modn.
As compliant to the timed asynchronous distributed sys-
tem model, we assume the presence of an alarm manager
task (task A) on each node of the system, spawned at ini-
tialization time by the agent. Task A is used to translate
time-related clauses, e.g., “t clock ticks have elapsed”, into
message arrivals. Let us call task A[j] the task A running
on node j, 0 ≤ j < n. Task A may be represented as a
function
a : C →M
Figure 5. A representation of the conjoint ac-
tion of task I and task D on the “I’m alive”
flag.
such that, for any time-related clause c ∈ C,
a(c) = message “clause c has elapsed” ∈M.
Task A[j] monitors a set of time-related clauses and,
each time one of them occurs, say clause c, it sends task
D[j] message a(c). Messages are sent via asynchronous
primitives based on mailboxes.
In particular, the coordinator, which we assume to run
initially on node m, instructs its taskA so that the following
clauses be managed:
• (MIA SEND, j, MIA SEND TIMEOUT), j different
from m: every MIA SEND TIMEOUT clock ticks, a
message of type (MIA SEND, j) should be sent to task
D[m], i.e., task D on the current node. This latter will
respond to such event by sending each taskD[j] a MIA
(manager is alive) message.
• (TAIA RECV, j, TAIA RECV TIMEOUT) for each
j different from m: every TAIA RECV TIMEOUT
clock ticks at most, a message of type TAIA is to be
received from task D[j]. The arrival of such a mes-
sage or of any other “sign of life” from task D[j]
translates also in renewing the corresponding alarm.
On the other hand, the arrival of a message of type
(TAIA RECV, k), k different from m, sent by task
A[m], warns taskD[m] that assistant on node k sent no
sign of life throughout the TAIA RECV TIMEOUT-
clock-tick period just elapsed. This makes task D[m]
set its flag sus[k].
Figure 6. Pseudo-code of the coordinator.
• (I’M ALIVE SET, m, I’M ALIVE SET TIMEOUT):
every I’M ALIVE SET TIMEOUT clock ticks, task
A[m] sends task D[m] an I’M ALIVE SET message.
As a response to this, task D[m] sets the “I’m alive”
flag, a memory variable that is shared between tasks of
type D and I.
Furthermore, whenever flag sus[k] is set, for any k differ-
ent from m, the following clause is sent to task A for being
managed:
• (TEIF RECV, k, TEIF RECV TIMEOUT): this clause
simply asks taskA[m] to schedule the sending of mes-
sage (TEIF RECV, k) to task D[m] after TEIF RECV
TIMEOUT clock ticks. This action is canceled should
a late TAIA message arrive to task D[m] from task k,
or should a TEIF message from task I[k] arrive in-
stead. In the first case, sus[k] is cleared and (possibly
empty) actions corresponding to a slowed down task
D[k] are taken. In the latter case, task D[k] is as-
sumed to have crashed, its clauses are removed from
the list of those managed by task A[m], and flag sus[k]
is cleared. It is assumed that task I[k] will take care in
this case of reviving task D[k]. Any future sign of life
from task D[k] is assumed to mean that task D[k] is
back in operation. In such a case task D[k] would then
be re-entered in the list of operational assistants, and
task D[m] would then request task A[m] to include
again an alarm of type (MIA SEND, k, MIA SEND
TIMEOUT) and an alarm of type (TAIA RECV, k,
TAIA RECV TIMEOUT) in its list. If a (TEIF RECV,
k) message reaches task D[m], the entire node k is as-
sumed to have crashed. Node recovery may start at
this point, if available, or a warning message should
be sent to an external operator so that, e.g., node k be
rebooted.
Similarly any assistant, say the one on node k, instructs
its task A so that the following clauses be managed:
• (TAIA SEND, m, TAIA SEND TIMEOUT): every
TAIA SEND TIMEOUT clock ticks, a message of
type (TAIA SEND, m) is to be sent to task D[k],
i.e., task D on the current node. This latter will
respond to such event by sending task D[m] (i.e.,
the manager) a TAIA (this agent is alive) message.
Should a data message be sent to the manager in the
middle of TAIA SEND TIMEOUT-clock-tick period,
alarm (TAIA SEND, m, TAIA SEND TIMEOUT) is
renewed. This may happen for instance because one
of the basic TIRAN tools for error detection reports an
event to taskD[k]. Such event must be sent to the man-
ager for it to update its database. In this case we say
that the TAIA message is sent in piggybacking with the
event notification message.
Figure 7. Pseudo-code of the assistant.
• (MIA RECV, m, MIA RECV TIMEOUT): every
MIA RECV TIMEOUT clock ticks at most, a message
of type MIA is to be received from task D[m], i.e., the
manager. The arrival of such a message or of any other
“sign of life” from the manager translates also in re-
newing the corresponding alarm. If a message of type
(MIA RECV, m), is received from task D[k] and sent
by task A[k], this means that no sign of life has been
received from the manager throughout the MIA RECV
TIMEOUT-clock-tick period just elapsed. This makes
task D[k] set flag sus[m].
• (I’M ALIVE SET, k, I’M ALIVE SET TIMEOUT):
every I’M ALIVE SET TIMEOUT clock ticks, task
A[k] sends task D[k] an I’M ALIVE SET message.
As a response to this, task D[k] sets the “I’m alive”
flag.
Furthermore, whenever flag sus[m] is set, the following
clause is sent to task A[k] for being managed:
• (TEIF RECV, m, TEIF RECV TIMEOUT): this
clause simply asks task A[k] to postpone sending
message (TEIF RECV, k) to task D[k] of TEIF RECV
TIMEOUT clock ticks. This action is canceled
should a late MIA message arrive to task D[k] from
the manager, or should a TEIF message from task
I[m] arrive instead. In the first case, sus[m] is cleared
and possibly empty actions corresponding to a slowed
down manager are taken. In the latter case, task D[m]
is assumed to have crashed, its clause is removed from
the list of those managed by task A[k], and flag sus[m]
is cleared. It is assumed that task I[m] will take care
in this case of reviving task D[m]. Any future sign of
life from taskD[m] is assumed to mean that taskD[m]
is back in operation. In such a case task D[m] would
be demoted to the role of assistant and entered in the
list of operational assistants. The role of coordinator
would then have been assigned, via an election, to an
agent formerly running as assistant.
If a (TEIF RECV, m) message reaches task D[k], the en-
tire node of the manager is assumed to have crashed. Node
recovery may start at this point. An election takes place—
the next assistant (modulo n) is elected as new manager.
Also task I on each node, say node k, instructs its task
A so that the following clause be managed:
• (I’M ALIVE CLEAR, k, I’M ALIVE CLEAR
TIMEOUT): every I’M ALIVE CLEAR TIMEOUT
clock ticks task A[k] sends task I[k] an I’M ALIVE
CLEAR message. As a response to this, task I[k]
clears the “I’m alive” flag.
Figures 3, 4, and 5 supply a pictorial representation of
this algorithm. Figure 6 and Fig. 7 respectively show a
pseudo-code of the coordinator and of the assistant.
3.1. The alarm manager class
This section briefly describes task A. This task makes
use of a special class to manage lists of alarms [8]. The class
allows the client to “register” alarms, specifying alarm-ids
and deadlines.
Once the first alarm is entered, the task managing alarms
creates a linked-list of alarms and polls the top of the list.
For each new alarm to be inserted, an entry in the list is
found and the list is modified accordingly. If the top entry
expires, a user-defined alarm function is invoked. This is a
general mechanism that allows to associate any event with
the expiring of an alarm. In the case of the backbone, task
A on node k sends a message to task D[k]—the same result
may also be achieved by sending an UNIX signal to task
D[k]. Special alarms are defined as “cyclic”, i.e., they are
automatically renewed at each new expiration, after invok-
ing the alarm function. A special function restarts an alarm,
i.e., it deletes and re-enters an entry. It is also possible to
temporarily suspend an alarm and re-enable it afterwards.
4. Current status and future directions
A prototypal implementation of the TIRAN backbone is
running on a Parsytec Xplorer, a MIMD engine, using 4
PowerPC nodes. The system has been tested and proved
to be able to tolerate a number of software-injected faults,
e.g., component and node crashes (see Fig. 8 and Fig. 9).
Faults are scheduled as another class of alarms that, when
triggered, send a fault injection message to the local task
D or task I . The specification of which fault to inject is
read by the backbone at initialisation time from a file called
“.faultrc”. The user can specify fault injections by editing
this file, e.g., as follows:
INJECT CRASH ON COMPONENT 1
AFTER 5000000 TICKS
INJECT CRASH ON NODE 0
AFTER 10000000 TICKS.
The first two lines inject a crash on taskD[1] after 5 seconds
from the initialisation of the backbone, the second ones in-
ject a system reboot of node 0 after 10 seconds. Via fault in-
jection it is also possible to slow down artificially a compo-
nent for a given period. Slowed down components are tem-
porarily and automatically disconnected and then accepted
again in the application when their performance goes back
to normal values. Scenarios are represented into a Netscape
window where a monitoring application displays the struc-
ture of the user application, maps the backbone roles onto
the processing nodes of the system, and constantly reports
about the events taking place in the system [7].
This system has been recently redeveloped so to en-
hance its portability and performance and to improve its
resilience. The backbone is currently being implemented
for target platforms based on Windows CE, VxWorks, and
TEX [2]. A GSPN model of the algorithm of mutual sus-
picion has been developed by the University of Turin, Italy,
and has been used to validate and evaluate the system. Sim-
ulations of this model proved the absence of deadlocks and
livelocks. Measurements of the overheads in fault free sce-
narios and when faults occur will also be collected and anal-
ysed.
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